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for Rusyns, even in their ancestral home. Where should their loyalties lie: With the
state that possessed their lands? With their own ethnic group? With the large
Ukrainian community, or even the community of Slavic nations? Or with the
linguistically and culturally diverse peoples of the Carpathian Basin? For those
Rusyns who settled in America, the options were even more numerous, as they
could also feel an obligation of loyalty to their new homeland. Furthermore, for
these immigrants, religious identity came into question as well. In their homeland
they had belonged to the Greek or Eastern Rite Catholic Church. In America they
found the Roman Catholic hierarchy at best unsympathetic to the practice of Greek
Catholic traditions or, at worst, hostile to the idea of ethnic parishes and the preser-
vation of ancestral cultures. Such circumstances contributed to the abandonment of
Catholicism by many Rusyns and their return to the orthodox faith, and they led
to the emergence of two distinct branches of the Greek Catholic Church in America:
the Byzantine Ruthenian and the Ukrainian. But this was only one part of the
tortuous evolution of the Rusyns religious life in the New World.
Magocsi also discusses the Rusyn communitys organizational and political
evolution, its culture, and attempts at group maintenance. The main theme of these
aspects of Rusyn-American life is the continuation of debates over the questions of
group loyalty and identity. Of special interest to Canadian readers is chapter 9,
which deals with the Rusyn experience in Canada.
Magocsis book is well written and crafted. It is lavishly produced with numerous
illustrations, statistical tables, and maps, as well as detailed appendices offering
useful information on the Rusyns past and present in North America and in the
homeland.
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In Propaganda and Censorship During Canada’s Great War, Jeffrey A. Keshen
undertakes a systematic examination of Canadas use of propaganda in the various
media during this pivotal event. Most Canadians believe that the war signaled
Canadas emergence from colony to nation, itself a propaganda truism that Keshen
stands on its head. It was the postwar realization of the mendacity of the propagan-
da, he argues, that helped Canada to nationhood.
The public accepted the persistent propaganda clichés of imperialist jingoism,
nativism, and naiveté. Common belief has it that the Great War provoked a form
of totalitarian censorship. Yet Canadas Chief Censor, Lt.-Colonel Ernest J. Cham-
bers, a zealous ex-newspaperman, used persuasion to leash the mainstream press.
He saved his scissors to suppress some 253 publications of ethnic and political
minorities, whom he feared were fifth columnists or radical leftists.
Spared from seeing graphic pictures of the carnage or from hearing, reading, or
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seeing first-hand accounts of the horrific battles (Allied film censorship was so total
as to render recording of actual battles almost non-existent), the Canadian public
blithely continued to perpetuate romantic notions about combat in which their brave,
patriotic, and Christian conquering heroes bore a divinely inspired manliness and
selflessness. What remains extraordinary is that typical soldiers largely reiterated
these myths in letters and diaries to spare their loved ones anguish.
War was sport by other means, and Keshen reminds the reader that propaganda
crowed that the game offered great compensation to its players, promising soldiers
respect and female adulation. The troops own newspaperswere among the few voices
of dissent, but thesewere almost exclusively sarcastic safety valves filled with carping
about the leaders and black humour to vent frustration. Keshen concludes that Canadi-
an soldiers ultimately widened the postwar breach between participants and outsiders
that never closed. Yet why did most troops reinforce idealistic notions during the
conflict? The average recruit had not gone beyond Grade 6 and perhaps could not
articulate the world in which he was literally mired. That soldier also believed that
quiet resolve, duty, honour, and patriotism were his lot. Besides, it would not do to tell
ones family back home about the widespread drunkenness, smoking, swearing,
gambling, and whoring that were part of many soldiers leaves. One shocking sup-
pressed statisticwas that 66,346 soldierswere treated for venereal disease, some 4,000
more than the total who died as a result of the conflict.
Propagandas success could also be measured in the publics willingness to hate
the enemy, whose atrocities were legion. In such a context, truth was the first
casualty, aided by the impact of Canadas peripatetic news mogul, Max Aitken. As
Canadian Eye Witness, he saturated Allied populations with tales of Canadas pluck
and courage on the battlefield, which British censors promptly curbed. Aitken also
encouraged visual fabrication of actuality, both in photos and on film. By 1916
the Allies were producing newsreels, the majority of which showed faked battle
scenes. Most Allied actuality footage was in the form of marching regiments and
artillery firing, the newly introduced tank, occasional dead Germans, and plenty of
destroyed churches. (Few knew that church steeples were used by Allied soldiers
for reconnaissance purposes, hence were fair targets.) Keshen implies that the
Canadian public was more interested in seeing the travelling war trophy collection,
yet he does not mention that the two-minute newsreel was part of every film show
and probably reached a larger audience. One thinks, for example, of the hatred
generated in Victory Loan Trailer 1918, in which the merciless Hun destroys a
Canadian military hospital from the air, killing a dutiful nurse and her patients.
Conscription is discussed in the context of propaganda and Ottawas torpid
adoption of a centralized management and national publicity campaign. Keshen
breaks no new ground as he reiterates the well-known scandals as well as the
miserly and insensitive approach of Minister of Militia Sam Hughes. If propaganda
failed to make much of a difference in recruitment, including in Quebec, the author
does not state the real reason for the initial enthusiasm and flood of volunteers for
the Great War  the majority of those recruits were British-born. The ebb in
recruitment late in 1916 was as much a fact of demographics as it was of casualty
lists from the Somme.
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Keshen parallels the Australian conscription experience to Canadas. He demon-
strates that the Aussies, too, were wedded to imperialist ideology, also romanticizing
front-line reports and maintaining a more strict censorship than compliant Canada.
Australia sheltered a vulnerable public from grim battlefield truths but ended up
losing its conscription referendum, in part, Keshen insists, because it had no identi-
fiable group like French Canadians on which to focus as slackers.
The author states that Prime Minister Robert Borden acted out of a sincere belief
in the necessity of conscription, especially after seeing Canadian casualties while
overseas. One wishes that Keshen might have used his facts to break from this
traditional interpretation. Bordens popularity had been slipping as casualties grew;
he was in real danger of losing the next federal election, and his offer of a coalition
government with a cabinet of equal numbers of Tories and Liberals would leave
him as prime minister and the deciding vote in any cabinet debate. Keshen musters
the evidence to show that the election of 1917, with legislation stacked in favour
of the government, was one of Canadas most treacherous political moments in
terms of English-French relations. He details the role of pro-conscription propagan-
da, and the reader realizes the sobering fact that Bordens Union government
propaganda was so racist and damaging as to provide anti-federal ammunition to
future generations of Quebec nationalists. Yet Keshens last word is in defence of
Borden, leaving this reviewer wishing for a courageous historical revision some 80
years after the fact.
A few caveats: There are insufficient examples of posters to give the reader a
sense of the graphic and verbal appeal of the propaganda as one would expect in
such a book. Probably cost considerations explain their absence in this otherwise
excellent exposition. Keshen errs in his discussion of the National Film Board
production, The Kid Who Couldn’t Miss, a critical attack on war ace Billy Bishop.
As a result of the Senate hearing, the Film Board labelled it a docudrama, but
refused to withdraw the film as critics had demanded. It remains in circulation as
a flawed but early example of how recruitment propaganda was supposed to work
on the Canadian public. One wishes, too, that Keshen had explained the origin of
the term Johnny Canuck, which he uses throughout the book to identify the
typical Canadian soldier.
When the war was over, the mask of falsehood fell away and Canada began to
reject the imperial myth once and for all, realizing that it had been a cruel irony to
be treated as colonial inferiors by the arrogant British. As for propaganda, it had
earned such a negative grade that the British burned all papers of their propaganda
ministry. Fortunately for Jeffrey Keshen, Canada did not. Thus, overall, Propaganda
and Censorship is a worthy addition to the historiography of the Great War and
widens significantly the publics understanding of propaganda and its impact on that
event.
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